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What guile is this, that those her golden tresses
She doth attire under a net of gold;
And with sly skill so cunningly them dresses,
That which is gold or hair may scarce be told?
Fondness it were for any, being free,
To cover fetters, though they golden be.
“What Guile Is This?” 1–4, 13–14 (Edmund Spenser)
1 Introduction
The economic debate on the observed choice of an exchange rate regime has
had a long intellectual history, and this history is not without its controversies.1
The more recent literature has sought to clarify the economic consequences of
regimes by drawing a distinction between de facto and de jure fixed exchange
rates (Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger 2005; Reinhart & Rogoff 2004). However,
the ultimate decision over the form of exchange rate regime adopted may have
roots in not just purely economic motivations, but also political ones: As papers
studying the “fear of floating” phenomenon have shown, there may exist an un-
derlying political dimension to intervention in the foreign exchange market. For
example, conflicting policymaker objectives induce a time inconsistency prob-
lem with regard to the response of the central bank to exchange risk premia
shocks (Calvo & Reinhart 2002); a similar problem underpins a setup where the
ex post credibility to conduct countercyclical monetary policy is undermined by
liquidity shortages in the event of a crisis (Caballero & Krishnamurthy 2004).
Alternatively, accounting for a fixed social cost of intervention (Lahiri & Ve´gh
2001) may also raise political economy issues.
Concomitantly, while the onset of the Asian financial crisis has spawned a
flurry of third-generation models that attempt to explain the prevalent economic
phenomena that defined the crisis (such as concurrent banking and currency
crises, international illiquidity, and the real costs of financial crashes), political
factors (weak institutions, politically-driven moral hazard, and political conta-
gion spillover) have had less accounting for.2 This is despite empirical evidence
to the contrary. For example, the probability of speculative attacks on the
currency has been linked to election timing, constituent interests, and degree
of partisanship (Bernhard & Leblang 2000; Leblang 2002, 2003). More gener-
ally, political instability may play a role in shifting expectations that lead to
self-fulfilling exchange rate realignments (Eichengreen, Rose & Wypolsz 1995).
1For instance, the debate on fixed-versus-floating regimes is well known; the classic articles
making the case for each are those of Friedman (1953) and Kindleberger (1969), respectively.
Similarly, the closely-related literature on the optimal choice of an exchange rate regime has
occupied researchers for well over two decades; see Frankel (2003) for a recent, nontechnical
review.
2Similarly, both first- and second-generation models fail to provide a convincing political
story that captures the sophisticated interaction between political actors in the process of
policy formation.
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Furthermore, special interests have been found to be a significant influence on
both exchange rate depreciation as well as exchange rate volatility, after control-
ling for measures of credibility, economic structure, macroeconomic variables,
and various institutional characteristics, such as currency union membership
and capital controls (Frieden 2002).
Notwithstanding the pertinence of political factors as a supplement to eco-
nomic concerns, the actual study of the political economy of exchange rates has
had a fairly checkered history. Economists generally regard issues such as the
choice of exchange rate regime and the appropriate level of foreign exchange as
firmly in the domain of economic theory, while political scientists view exchange
rate issues as too technical and removed from the interests of either the mass
public or special interests to be of political relevance. With economic globaliza-
tion, however, greater constraints have been placed on the ability of countries
to impose tariffs and nontariff trade barriers within a multilateral framework.
This suggests that, increasingly, political actors might choose to redirect their
activity away from trade policy and toward exchange rate policy.3 After all, the
benefits of trade liberalization are often unambiguous and well-known; the case
for capital account liberalization, however, is less clear.
This political-economic currency game, while not new, is gradually com-
ing into prominence in policy circles. It has certainly been a defining factor
in Latin American economic history. Frieden & Stein (2001, pp. 11–16) sug-
gest that “[t]he impact of [special interest politics] on exchange rate policy has
evolved over time. . . . In the 1990s. . . the availability of compensatory mecha-
nisms declined and, in the midst of a substantial real appreciation. . . [special
interests] became much more vocal about exchange rate policy.” This has, on
occasion, erupted in the form of a massive run on the currency, imposing real
costs and economic hardship on the emerging economy involved.
Likewise, after the initial smoke cleared from the Asian financial crisis of
1997–98, commentators were quick to point out the cronyism, corruption, and
nepotism that was pervasive in much of East Asia, and that these political
dimensions were as much to blame for the financial collapse.
Politics in Thailand exerted a powerful influence over both the on-
set and initial management of the crisis. . . [i]n both Malaysia and
Indonesia, autocratic leaders exploited their discretion to. . . pursue
policies that contributed to market uncertainty. . . [i]n South Korea,
these difficulties [in financial adjustments] were primarily associated
with the electoral cycle, but also with the apparent influence wielded
by ailing chaebol. (Haggard 2000, p. 55, 71)
Taken together, there appears to be a clear need to provide a satisfactory
micro-political framework that models the interaction of political actors via
3As McKinnon & Fung (1993) note, exchange rate policy and trade policy are likely to be
close substitutes in terms of the compensation that they provide: For homogeneous goods, a
1% depreciation is equivalent to a 1% export subsidy used in conjunction with a 1% import tax.
For heterogeneous industries, substitutability is not perfect, but the effects are qualitatively
similar.
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special interest politics—broadly defined—in the determination of a managed
peg,4 and how, under certain conditions, pandering to these interests may usher
in a currency crisis. This paper seeks to plug that gap by explicitly introducing
lobbying and legislative activity into the exchange rate policymaking decision.
We use, as our point of departure, a model of monopolistically competitive
agents in the small open economy (Obstfeld & Rogoff 1995). We then introduce
ex ante agent heterogeneity coupled with short-term price stickiness such that
exchange rates generate a real effect on agent welfare. Consequently, with these
real effects, the exchange rate is now amenable as a policy variable that becomes
the subject of political competition.
The stage game models the interaction between politically-organized agents
and policymakers, how this translates to pressures on the size of the exchange
rate revaluation or devaluation when effected by a partially independent mone-
tary authority. The observed exchange rate, which is the managed peg solution,
may be inconsistent with economic fundamentals, and induce a run on the cur-
rency. To the extent that such activity might lead to a currency crisis, we then
outline the conditions surrounding the timing and possibility of the currency
crisis. In the empirical section, we take this model to the data. We find, using
a measure of political risk as a proxy for special interest influence, that the
probability of a regime switch is determined, in part, by the extent of special
interest pressures faced.
This paper is primarily a theoretical contribution. The model that we intro-
duce explicitly takes political interactions into account in modeling a managed
peg which, ultimately, is a policy choice subject to political pressures. In do-
ing so, it draws on both the new open economy macroeconomics literature and
the new political economy literature. However, the empirical section also ap-
plies a novel approach to the identification of regime switches in the context
of a managed peg. This identification strategy is helpful, since there are cur-
rently no published data—nor any academic consensus—on the exact timing of
endogenous revaluations and devaluations in such systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline ana-
lytical model. Two extensions of this model are considered in Section 3, and
Section 4 looks at the data. A concluding section provides reflections on policy.
2 The Analytical Framework
2.1 Households
The world economy is the set I populated by N distinct agents, with preferences
such that for a particular agent i, her intertemporal utility function given by
U it =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
{
logCis + χ log
M is
Ps
− κ
i
2
[ys (i)]
2
}
, (1)
4In practice, the distinction between a managed peg and a dirty float is not always clear,
and often a matter of (arbitrary) degree. We use the term managed peg here, bearing in mind
that this may also characterize an actively managed floating regime.
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where C, MP , and y are the real consumption index, real money balances, and
production, respectively, and 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor. Each
individual Home agent is therefore a monopolistic yeoman producer, and goods
reside on the interval z ∈ [0, 12]; foreign agents reside on z ∈ ( 12 , 1].5 Note that
we have assumed that κi can differ across individuals; this simply captures pro-
ductivity differentials across agents.6 The consumption index is an aggregation
of all goods consumed in the economy:
Cis =
[∫ 1
0
cis (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
, (2)
where ci (z) is the consumption of good z by individual i, and θ > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution. The nominal price index at Home that corresponds
to (2) is given by7
Ps =
[∫ 1
0
ps (z)
1−θ
dz
] 1
1−θ
, (3)
where the domestic currency price of good z is given by p (z). Analogous aggre-
gators C∗ and P ∗ hold for Foreign.
Each agent faces a period budget constraint given by
Bis+1 +
M is
Ps
= (1 + rs)Bis +
M it−1
Ps
+
ps (i)
Ps
ys (i)− Cis − τs, (4)
where the real interest rate is denoted r, τ is a lump-sum tax in terms of
the consumption good, and the stock of internationally-traded riskless bonds
(denominated in terms of the consumption good) held by agent i is Bi.
2.2 Government
We assume that Ricardian equivalence holds, such that governments constrain
themselves to run a balanced fiscal budget each period, and moreover rebate all
seignorage revenues back to the public via transfers:
τs = −Ms+1 −Ms
Ps
. (5)
Government policymakers are benevolent and possess objective functions that
seek to maximize the welfare of all agents in the economy:
EsU
G
s = Es
∫
i∈I
V is di, (6)
5This stylized approach loses none of the complexities inherent in a more sophisticated
production structure. In the appendix, we sketch out the basics of a model with households
and firms and show that similar ex ante heterogeneity may result.
6To see this, assume a linear production function given by y (i) = Ai [l (i)]α, where α < 1,
and Ai is a measure of productivity. If we let disutility of effort given by −φ (l + l∗), inverting
the production function and setting α = 1/2 and κi = 2φ/(Ai)1/α gives the output term as
it appears in (1). The variable κi is therefore an inverse measure of productivity.
7Detailed derivations of selected equations are provided in a separate mathematical ap-
pendix that accompanies this paper, available at the author’s website.
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where V i is the net welfare of a group i.
2.3 Special Interests
There exists a subset of the population J ⊆ I, that are able to overcome Olson-
style collective action problems and organize themselves as organized special
interests. Such agents offer their schedule of lobbying contributions, Li, with
the aim of influencing policy outcomes. The expected net welfare of an organized
agent is
EsV
i
s = EsU
i
s −
(
Lis
)2
2
. (7)
The contribution schedule is assumed to be continuous, differentiable, and non-
negative, and is the outcome of the program that maximizes (7).
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
The consumption aggregator (2) implies that the intratemporal Home and For-
eign demands for a particular product z are given respectively by
cis (z) =
[
ps (z)
Ps
]−θ
Cis, (8)
c∗is (z) =
[
p∗s (z)
P ∗s
]−θ
C∗is , (9)
which are standard demand functions for a monopolist producer. When taken
together, we have world demand for product z given by
ys (z) =
[
ps (z)
Ps
]−θ ∫ 1
2
0
Cis di+
[
p∗s (z)
P ∗s
]−θ ∫ 1
1
2
C∗is di
≡
[
ps (z)
Ps
]−θ
Cs +
[
p∗s (z)
P ∗s
]−θ
C∗s .
(10)
Agents maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to their budget constraint (4), and
this yields the standard intertemporal Euler, the intratemporal Euler between
real money demand and consumption, and the labor-leisure tradeoff:
Cis+1 = β (1 + rs+1)C
i
s, (11)
M is
Ps
= χ
[
1 + is+1
is+1
]
Cis, (12)
ys (i)
θ+1
θ =
θ − 1
θκi
(Cs + C∗s )
1
θ
1
Cis
, (13)
where we have made use of Fischer parity 1 + is+1 =
Ps+1
Ps
(1 + rs+1) in (12)
to obtain the relationship in terms of nominal interest rates i. In addition,
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equilibrium requires the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
Rt,t+T
[
Bt+T+1 +
Mt+T
Pt+T
]
= 0,
where Rt,t+T ≡ 1∏s
v=t+1(1+rv)
is the market discount factor for date t + T con-
sumption.
To close the economic side of our model, we require the market clearing
conditions that must exist in equilibrium at Home (with similar equations char-
acterizing equilibrium abroad):∫ 1
2
0
Bis+1 di+
∫ 1
1
2
B∗is+1 di = 0, (14)∫ 1
2
0
Cis di+
∫ 1
1
2
C∗is di =
∫ 1
2
0
ps (z)
Ps
ys (z) dz +
∫ 1
1
2
p∗s (z
∗)
P ∗s
y∗s (z
∗) dz, (15)
which are the asset and goods market clearing conditions, respectively.
In a world with no trade frictions and fully flexible prices, the law of one
price will hold for each individual good:
ps (z) = εp∗s (z) , (16)
where the exchange rate, ε, is defined in terms of the Home currency price of
Foreign currency. Equation (16) then allows us to rewrite (3) such that
Ps =
[∫ 1
2
0
ps(z)
1−θ
dz +
∫ 1
1
2
εp∗s(z)
1−θ
dz
] 1
1−θ
,
with an analogous expression for P ∗. Taken together, these two equations sug-
gest that the purchasing power parity relation
Ps = εP ∗s (17)
holds when there are flexible prices in both countries. We assume that prices
are inflexible for one period at Home, returning to the long-run flexible price
after this period. Foreign prices are always flexible.
The gross welfare of an agent is obtained by substituting into (1) the optimal
values of C and y that result from solving the system (11)–(13), after log-
linearization around the long-run symmetric steady state. We can then establish
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Assume for any i, i′ ∈ I: (a) κi 6= κi′ ; (b) ps (i) 6= ps+1 (i) = p¯ (i).
Then agent welfare changes are given by
dU is = Φ
iεˆs +
1
θ
MˆWs ,
where Φi ≡ (1+γ)(θ
2−1)
2[γ(1+θ)+2θ] · κ−κ
i
κ , γ ≡ 1−ββ , and εˆ and MˆW are the deviations of
the exchange rate and world money supply from their symmetric steady state
values, respectively.
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Proof. See appendix.
The lemma shows that, if agents possess heterogeneous levels of productiv-
ity, one-period price stickiness implies that changes in the exchange rate affect
welfare.8 Note that our model leaves the decision to engage in local versus
producer currency pricing unexplained; rather, we have simply assumed that,
because of idiosyncratic agents, exchange rate deviations make a difference to
their welfare.9 From this we immediately arrive at the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any i, i′ ∈ I, for a given ε˜s 6= 0, U is (ε˜s) ≷ U i
′
s (ε˜s), where
ε˜s = dˆ¯0 .
Proof. See appendix.
This corollary implies that there for any given deviation ε˜ of the exchange
rate from the symmetric steady state, agents are differentially affected by this
deviation. In particular, we can rank the welfare of agents along a continuum
such that for any given ε˜, we have the following:
dU1s (ε˜s) > . . . > 0 > . . . > dU
N
s (ε˜s) ,
where we have chosen the index such that agent 1 (agent N) experiences the
greatest ex post welfare increase (decrease) as a result of the exchange rate
change.
2.5 Political Equilibrium
With the importance of the exchange rate established, we now turn our attention
to how the decision regarding an exchange rate revaluation or devaluation results
from political dynamics.
The sequence of events is as follows: (a) Policymakers make their announce-
ments of exchange rate revaluation (εR) or devaluation (εD) targets, being un-
certain about the underlying fundamentals of the economy; (b) The uncertainty
is resolved, and special interests offer their lobbying contributions to influence
the regime choice; (c) The monetary authority chooses the exchange rate regime
according to a preset exchange rate rule, and the economywide exchange rate
regime is realized (with an ex post probability ψ). The timing assumptions are
summarized as Figure 1.
Definition 1. The (pure strategy) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the
currency game is a pair {{Li∗}
i∈J , ε
∗} such that: (a) Li∗ is feasible ∀i ∈ J ; (b)
∀i ∈ J, k = D,R: { @ Lik′ 6= Lik∗ such that EV i (Lik∗, εik∗) ≤ EV i (Lik′, εik′)};
(c) @ εk′ 6= εk∗ such that EUG (εk∗) ≤ EUG (εk′) ∀k = D,R.
8There are alternative mechanisms where deviations in the exchange can affect welfare.
Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) show that distortionary taxes on labor lead to an expenditure-
switching effect, such that agent welfare is affected by a currency depreciation.
9Devereux, Engel & Storgaard (2004) endogenize the process of exchange rate pass-through
and find that the degree of pass-through is dependent on, inter alia, the relative stability of
monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Sequence of events.
We solve the game by backward induction. We assume that, prior to the
first stage at time t, the exchange rate is set at an initial level ε0. Since the
entire game takes place within a given time period s, we drop time subscripts
in what follows, reintroducing them only in our discussion of the evolution of
the exchange rate over time.
In the final stage, the monetary authority chooses whether to revalue or
devalue the exchange rate. We assume, without loss of generality, that the
preference of the monetary authority for an exchange rate devaluation is given
by
ρ = ρ˜+ ν
(
LD − LR) , (18)
where ρ˜ ∼ U [− 12η , 12η ] is the (exogenous) distribution of the preferences of the
monetary authority for the devaluation, and Lk =
∫
i∈J L
ik di is the aggregate
contributions received from all lobbying groups in favor of regime k. ν > 0 is
a measure of the extent to which lobbying activity influences the monetary au-
thority’s decision. Note that this influence need not be invidious; contributions
may reflect, for example, publicity campaigns that make a case for (or against)
a devaluation. We will see in a moment, however, that regardless of intent, such
activity imposes a nontrivial influence on the final exchange rate outcome.
The random variable ρ˜ may be interpreted as an ex ante preference for a par-
ticular regime. For example, the monetary authority may prefer a devaluation
if the prevailing exchange rate is currently overvalued, based on assessments of
the underlying fundamentals of the economy.
The regime that is ultimately chosen is, in turn, determined by a fairly
straightforward rule that equates:
U ι
(
εD
)
= U ι
(
εR
)
+ ρ, (19)
where ι ∈ I is the marginal agent that is indifferent between a revaluation or
a devaluation. Note that this exchange rate rule is fairly reasonable: The rule
seeks to equate the resultant welfare impact of the regime for this marginal
agent, adjusted by the preferences of the monetary authority. (18) and (19),
together with the distributional assumptions, then give the probability of a
devaluation regime being chosen:
ψD =
1
2
+ η
[
U ι
(
εD
)− U ι (εR)− ν (LD − LR)] . (20)
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Equation (20) implies that, because of the uncertainty embedded in the deci-
sion to revalue, we potentially observe movements in the exchange rate in each
period. In the absence of this uncertainty, with the distribution of productivity
(and hence agents’ preferences for a revaluation or devaluation) fixed over time,
the exchange rate will always follow a deterministic path, regardless of the pref-
erences of the monetary authority. Allowing for probabilistic revaluation then
affords the monetary authority some (limited) independence over exchange rate
outcomes.
In the penultimate stage, special interests choose their contributions with
respect to each regime by maximizing expected utility, net of contributions:
EV i = ψDU i
(
εD
)
+ ψRU i
(
εR
)− 1
2
[(
LiD
)2
+
(
LiR
)2]
. (21)
Using the fact that ψD =
(
1− ψR), the optimal contributions for a group i is
then given by
LiR = max
{
0, ην
[
U i
(
εD
)− U i (εR)]} ,
LiD = −min{0, ην [U i (εD)− U i (εR)]} . (22)
Equation (22) gives the intuitive result that any given group i will never con-
tribute toward seeking both a revaluation and a devaluation, and moreover, may
choose not to offer any contributions at all. The choice of either is determined,
in turn, by which contribution would maximize the group’s net welfare.
Another feature of the result above is that these contribution schedules
are locally truthful, in the sense of Bernheim & Whinston (1986). This lo-
cal truthfulness property implies that, in the neighborhood of the equilibrium,
the marginal impact of the exchange rate change on lobbying contributions are
equivalent to the impact of this change on a lobbying group’s welfare.
In the first stage, policymakers optimize (6)
UG = ψD
∫
i∈I
U i
(
εD
)
di+ ψR
∫
i∈I
U i
(
εR
)
di, (23)
The first order conditions for (23) are
∂ψD
∂εD
∫
i∈I
[
U i
(
εD
)− U i (εR)] di+ ψD ∫
i∈I
∂U i
(
εD
)
∂εD
di = 0,
∂ψD
∂εR
∫
i∈I
[
U i
(
εD
)− U i (εR)] di+ ψD ∫
i∈I
∂U i
(
εR
)
∂εR
di = 0,
where ∂ψ
D
∂εD
= η ∂U
ι
∂εD
+ (ην)2
∫
i∈J
∂Ui
∂εD
di and ∂ψ
D
∂εR
= −η ∂Uι
∂εR
− (ην)2 ∫
i∈J
∂Ui
∂εR
di.
Notice the essential symmetry between the two conditions, which implies that
the optimal choices for a revaluation or devaluation target will involve a devia-
tion of exactly the same degree. To develop intuition, assume that agent welfare
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is approximated by functional form equivalent to that given in Lemma 1.10 We
then obtain
εD =
∣∣∣∣∣∣−
(
Φι + ην2ΦJ + 4Φ
I
N
)
MˆW
2θ + Φ
I
(
1
4η + ην
2
∫
i∈J
MˆW
θ di
)
2ΦI (Φι + ην2ΦJ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = εR, (24)
where ΦJ ≡ ∫
i∈J Φ
i di and ΦI ≡ ∫
i∈I Φ
i di, and we have used the fact the
U i
(
εD
)
= −U i (εR). Thus, optimal change in the exchange rate regime is de-
termined by, inter alia, the distribution of preferences of the monetary authority
with respect to a devaluation or revaluation (η); the distribution of household
productivity, in particular with respect to the marginal agent (Φι), special in-
terests (ΦJ), and the general population (ΦI); and the extent to which the
monetary authority is influenced by lobbying contributions (ν). As a result of
lobbying contributions, therefore, special interest pressure becomes entangled
with general welfare considerations in the determination of an exchange rate
regime.
We summarize the results of our baseline model as a proposition.
Proposition 1 (Politico-economic managed peg). The currency game of Defi-
nition 1 yields an exchange rate
ε˘ =
{
ε0 + εD(MˆW ,ΦJ ; θ, γ, κ, ν) if devaluation occurs,
ε0 − εR(MˆW ,ΦJ ; θ, γ, κ, ν) if revaluation occurs,
where ε0 is the initial value of the exchange rate.
The optimal target—and hence realized exchange rate due to a devaluation
or revaluation—is determined by economic parameters for the household (θ, γ, κ)
and policymaker (η) and political-economic parameters (ν), as well as deviations
of the world money supply (MˆW ) and the distribution of productivity among
special interests (ΦJ). Thus, in our model exchange rate policy cycles are driven
not so much by electoral competition (Alfaro 2002; Bonomo & Terra 2005; Stein
& Streb 2004) but by lobbying activity, although we do not deny the potential
importance of the election effect.
To gain some additional intuition on the political dynamics underlying the
regime decision, we derive the following comparative static result.
Corollary 2. Let Φι = 0,ΦJ > 0,ΦI < 0. Then ∂ε
D
∂ν > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
This result implies that the devaluation will be larger, the greater the in-
fluence of lobbying activity. Moreover, this occurs as long as the net aggregate
10This is a convenient shortcut, since strictly speaking agent welfare is best represented as
an n-th order linear approximation of (1). We are in effect limiting the welfare criterion to
first moments, which we justify by the necessity of keeping the model tractable.
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welfare of special interests is increased as a result (as captured by ΦJ > 0), even
if net aggregate welfare of the population as a whole will decrease (ΦI < 0).
Note that Corollary 2 also implies that, if ε0 is given, by Proposition 1 we also
have ∂ε˘∂ν > 0; the greater the influence of special interest lobbying, the higher
(lower) will be the realized exchange rate for a given devaluation (revaluation).
This finding expands on the result in Edwards (1999). In particular, political
risk—a feature exogenous to Edwards’ model—arises due to the way that more
intensive lobbying activity increases the magnitude of a given regime change.
Since this change leads to the exchange rate becoming more disconnected from
the general welfare, the cost of abandoning the peg is amplified.
2.6 Currency Crisis
Jockeying over the exchange rate regime targets can create conditions that may
influence the timing as well as the possibility a currency crisis. To examine this
scenario, we adapt the framework of first-generation currency crisis models first
introduced into the literature by Krugman (1979) and Flood & Garber (1984)
into our microfounded model.
To integrate our analysis, we need to relax the assumptions concerning the
government budget constraint (5). In particular, we no longer assume that the
fiscal budget is balanced in each period, but is instead given by
τs +
Ms+1 − (1 + µ)Ms
Ps
= Gs, (5′)
where G denotes real government spending, and µ > 0 is the rate of expansion of
the nominal money supply. The monetary authority’s balance sheet is assumed
to comprise foreign assets in foreign exchange reserves, F , and domestic credit,
D:
Ms = Fs +Ds,
where these assets are defined in nominal terms. We assume that reserve growth
is kept constant over time, such that Fs+1 = (1 + µ)Fs ∀s. Making the neces-
sary substitutions we obtain11
∆ds ≈ µ+ ξs+1, (25)
where ∆ds ≡ ds+1−ds is the change in domestic credit, ξ ≡ ln [P (G− τ)] is the
nominal value of the primary deficit, and lowercase letters represent logarithms.
We also relax our assumption of perfectly substitutable risk-free international
bonds, such that the agent’s period budget constraint is now
Bis+1+εsB
i∗
s+1+
M is
Ps
= (1 + is)Bis+Esεs+1 (1 + i
∗
s)+
M it−1
Ps
+
ps (i)
Ps
ys (i)−Cis−τs,
(4′)
11A similar result was first demonstrated in Bullard (1991).
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where, as before, asterisks denote foreign variables. Uncovered interest parity
can then be easily derived as an additional first order condition in the house-
hold’s optimization problem:
1 + is = (1 + i∗s)
Esεs+1
εs
. (26)
Log-linearization of (12), (17), and (26), and substituting the latter two equa-
tions into the first, and using the balance sheet relation, we obtain the expres-
sion:
∆εs =
1 + γ
γ
εs − 1 + γ
γ
(fs + ds) + Z, (27)
where ∆εs ≡ Esεs+1 − εs is the change in the expected exchange rate, Z ≡
1+γ
γ (p
∗ + c0) − i∗, which we assume to be constant. The two-equation system
(25) and (27) in domestic credit and exchange rates characterize the standard
first-generation crisis models. In particular, the evolution of domestic credit at
the rate µ is incompatible with the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate regime.
Lemma 2 (Krugman 1979). Let ξs = 0 ∀s. Then µ > 0 is incompatible with
the indefinite maintenance of a fixed exchange rate. Moreover, this occurs at a
time
T =
ln
(
1 + F0D0
)
µ
− γ
1 + γ
< T˜ ,
where T˜ is the time that corresponds to the full exhaustion of reserves in the
absence of a speculative attack.
Proof. See appendix.
This lemma embeds the Krugman (1979) result into our model of the open
economy. It restates the important point that the successful maintenance of
the fixed regime must occur within the context of consistent macroeconomic
policies. Thus, even when the primary deficit is zero, the requirement that the
monetary authority monetize domestic credit will eventually lead to a run on
the currency. Furthermore, the lemma pins down the time of the abandonment
as the point where the shadow exchange rate (Flood & Garber 1984) is equal
to the fixed exchange rate.
In general, the realized exchange rate ε˘ that results from the political-
economic currency game differs from the exchange rate ε¯ that would result with
a fixed regime. This leads to differences in the optimal time of abandonment
due to a speculative attack, as summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 (Abandonment of managed peg). The optimal abandonment
time for the political-economic managed peg is given by
T˘ =
ln
(
1 + F0D0
)
± εD(MˆW ,ΦJ ; θ, γ, κ, ν)
µ
− γ
1 + γ
.
The difference in the time of abandonment due to a politico-economic managed
peg and a pure fixed exchange rate regime, (T˘ − T ), will generally be nonzero.
13
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition implies that political-economic factors may influence the
timing and possibility of a currency crisis. In particular, if the resulting path of
the exchange rate follows one of revaluation due to the greater influence of spe-
cial interest pressure, (T˘ −T ) < 0, which means that the crisis will occur earlier
than in the absence of such political-economic interferences. Alternatively, if
the distribution of special interests are such that, in aggregate, they prefer an
exchange rate depreciation, then their lobbying contributions potentially induce
a devaluations of the exchange rate, which postpones the speculative attack.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the scenario described above. In the deterministic
case with no political-economic influences, the shadow exchange rate is given
by the dashed line ε˜, while the fixed regime is given by ε0 = ε¯ the actual
exchange rate follows the (probabilistic) path traced by the solid line ε. After
each period, the government adjusts the currency peg, according to the extent
to which it faces pressures for either a revaluation or a devaluation; this is
represented by ε˘s. This actual time of abandonment to a flexible regime, T˘ , is
now brought forward relative to the time T if the peg is abandoned in response
to the underlying shadow exchange rate (given a speculative attack).
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Figure 2: Differences in optimal time of abandonment.
Alternatively, Figure 2(b) captures the idea that such pressures may actu-
ally postpone, and perhaps rule out indefinitely, the possibility of a speculative
attack. Here, we have drawn a hypothetical path over six periods s = [1, 6].
Note that, in accordance with (24), these devaluations/revaluations are all of
equal magnitude. Because the actual path of the exchange rate never intersects
with the shadow exchange rate, there is no incentive to perpetuate a run on the
currency, and the speculative attack is postponed (in our example) indefinitely.
We should point out that our analysis—having relied on the standard first-
generation framework—does not explicitly account for optimizing behavior on
the part of government policymakers with respect to the choice of abandon-
ment.12 However, to the extent that such special interests do exist in reality,
12On this, see Rebelo & Ve´gh (2002), who also place the first-generation crisis model in a
microfounded framework. The decision to abandon the peg in this case depends on the poli-
14
our analysis suggests that it would be premature to claim that such lobbying
activity necessarily leads to a crisis occurring at an earlier time.
3 Extensions
This section will briefly consider two elaborations of the basic model: First, we
distinguish between the policymaker and the monetary authority; and second,
we consider a richer set of political dynamics involving the legislature.
3.1 Semi-Independent Monetary Authority
In our baseline model, we treated the government policymaker and the mon-
etary authority synonymously. In particular, while we afforded the monetary
authority some independence over devaluation outcomes—measured as the dis-
tribution of ρ˜—we asserted an exchange rate rule (19) that did not account for
other objectives of the central bank, such as price stability. In this subsection,
we seek to endogenize the semi-independence of the monetary authority by post-
ing a reduced-form loss function for the central bank that takes into account
both exchange rate decisions as well as price stability.13
Lohmann (1992) was the first to model the important interaction between
a partially independent central banker and a policymaker with the authority
to override the central banker’s policy decisions (at some finite cost). In some
senses, our analysis thus far already carries some of the same flavor. In our
model, the policymaker’s announced exchange rate revaluations or devaluations
take into account the rigid rule that will eventually be followed by the monetary
authority; such considerations of feasibility and consistency are at the heart of
the Lohmann (1992) approach.
Without loss of generality, let the monetary authority possess a quadratic
loss function given by14
Ls = ρ˜
(
εˆs − εDs
)2
+ (ys − y˜)2 + ωpi2s , (28)
where y˜ is the output target, and pi is the economywide inflation rate. The
central bank places a weight ρ˜ on fulfilling its obligations to effect a targeted
exchange rate devaluation, and ω > 1 on its anti-inflationary stance (which we
assume to dominate its concern for suboptimal output).
With short-run price stickiness, output differs from its flexible price equi-
librium level y¯. The result is the aggregate supply function which is inversely
cymaker’s response to fiscal shocks; any sufficiently large shock would lead to the immediate
abandonment of the peg.
13We keep the exposition simple and adopt a modification of the standard Barro & Gordon
(1983) framework. Woodford (2002) derives a loss function from a welfare-theoretic perspec-
tive, which is very similar to a standard loss function employed here.
14To understand the inclusion of the exchange rate target in the loss function, we appeal to
the empirical reality that monetary authorities are often constrained, by mandate, to fulfill—
to some limited extent—the open-market foreign exchange purchases of the country’s finance
ministry. See also Kirsanova, Leith & Wren-Lewis (2006).
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proportional to real wages:
ys = y¯ − (ws − ps)− ζs, (29)
where ζ is a conditional mean-zero supply shock. Following the literature, we
assume that nominal wages are set according to lagged prices such that ws =
Es−1ps. Making the necessary substitutions and solving the program (28) gives
us the following result.
Proposition 3. For a monetary authority that is only concerned with price
stability and the exchange rate regime, ∂ω∂ρ˜ < 0 ∀s. If the monetary authority is
also concerned with suboptimality of output, then ∂ω∂ρ˜ < 0 if ε
D
s > ks + ζs and
ρ˜ > 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, when the monetary authority has fairly soft preferences concerning
the suboptimality of output (vis-a`-vis inflation and the exchange rate regime),
we have a stark result: A central bank that values inflation will have weaker
preferences for devaluation. In the context of our baseline model, this involves
shifting the probability distribution for ρ˜ to the left. Intuitively, with PPP, a
devaluation will increase imported inflation. Hence, a central bank that places a
high weight on inflation will also generally abhor devaluation. Thus, in contrast
to the work of Lohmann (1992), the semi-independent central bank does not face
conflicting obligations in its fulfillment of exchange rate regime obligations for
the policymaker. This affords the monetary authority in our model a great deal
more flexibility in its actions, since it does not face the threat of the policymaker
exercising her escape clause veto.
3.2 Legislative Activity
Even in autocracies, proposals for policy changes generally do not occur in the
absence of debate. In this subsection, we provide greater structure to the first
stage of the game by modeling bargaining activity in the context of a legislature,
over a given policy proposal.
Let there be one lawmaker who represents each agent in the exchange rate
policy decision, and assume that the total number is odd. Lawmakers have ex-
pected utility given by EsULls = EsV
i
s . As before, interest groups offer lobbying
contributions to influence the monetary authority. In the first stage, however,
the declared revaluation/devaluation will now involve a legislative bargaining
process. In particular, nature first selects an agenda setter, a, who will make
a particular proposal for the exchange rate revaluation or devaluation; this is
then voted on, and the policy is adopted if it wins a majority, with the gen-
eral welfare-maximizing policy otherwise. The revised equilibrium definition is
presented below.
Definition 2. The (pure strategy) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the
currency game with legislative activity is a pair {{Li∗}
i∈J , ε
∗} such that: (a)
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Li∗ is feasible ∀i ∈ J ; (b) ∀i ∈ J, k = D,R: { @ Lik′ 6= Lik∗ such that
EV i
(
Lik∗, εik∗
) ≤ EV i (Lik′, εik′)}; (c) ∀l ∈ L, k = D,R: { @ εk′ 6= εk∗ such
that EU l
(
εk∗
) ≤ EU l (εk′) }.
This relatively straightforward extension dramatically changes the outcome
of the currency game, as shown in the proposition below.
Proposition 4. The currency game with legislative activity of Definition 2
yields an exchange rate proposal
ε˘a = ε˘l =
{
ε0 + εDl(MˆW ,ΦJ ; θ, γ, κ, ν) if devaluation occurs,
ε0 − εRl(MˆW ,ΦJ ; θ, γ, κ, ν) if revaluation occurs.
Let Φι = 0. Then this policy is adopted if
N/2∑
l=1
MˆW
(
Φi − 4NΦI
)
θΦiΦI
> N.
Proof. See appendix.
What is most striking about this result is that although the exchange rate
proposal is influenced by special interests (encapsulated in ΦJ and ν), the adop-
tion of the proposal depends only on the productivity distribution of the popu-
lation at large and the agent represented by the legislator who was selected as
the agenda setter. Our finding therefore echoes, in a limited sense, the work of
others studying the interaction of lobbying and legislative bargaining—such as
Helpman & Persson (2001)—that lobbying activity appears muted in equilib-
rium.
While both the context as well as the timing assumptions that we employ
differ, our surprising result is that, in equilibrium, special interest politics do not
influence the voting decision. The intuition here is due to the fact that legislators
recognize how special interests will influence the policy that is adopted even if
they vote against any given agenda setter’s proposal: Thus, they take this
into account in their voting decision, and only consider whether they—or more
precisely, their ward—will ultimately benefit from the revaluation or devaluation
proposed by legislator a.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section we test the main implications of the model using exchange rate
data. We test the main implications of the model. We adopt a two-part empir-
ical strategy: First, we apply a stationary two-state Markov switching AR(1)
model, nested within the class of models explored by Engel & Hamilton (1990)
and Engel (1994), to the nominal exchange rate. Second, we estimate a binary
panel Probit model using the regime switches that have been identified by the
17
Markov regression as the dependent variable, using the determinants implied by
our theoretical model as regressors.15
4.1 Econometric Methodology
To identify the between the regime switches between the two states D and
R, we seek six population parameters that characterize the probability law for
the dependent variable eˆt: Θ =
[
λD, λR, σ
2
D, σ
2
R, ψDD, ψRR
]′, where a given
state k = {D,R} is assumed to be drawn from a distribution N (λk, σ2k), and
ψDD (ψRR) is the transition probability to state D (state R) conditional on the
current state being D (being R). We seek to maximize the generalized objective
function
g (eˆt, . . . , eˆT ; Θ) = lnψ (eˆt, . . . , eˆT ; Θ)−
∑
k=D,R
δ˜λ2k
2σ2k
−
∑
k=D,R
α˜ lnσ2k −
∑
k=R,D
β˜
σ2k
,
(30)
where α˜, β˜, and δ˜ are Bayesian priors for the parameters corresponding to each
of the two regimes. Of particular interest to us are the estimates for ψDD and
ψRR, which identify regime switches based on the unconditional probability
ψ (kt | eˆ1, . . . , eˆT ; Θ) ≷ 0.5.
In the second step, we use these estimates as (assumed) binary switches,
such that for a panel with N countries over a time period T we have a panel
Probit specification given by
eˆ∗nt = αn + XntΓ + υnt,
eˆnt = 1 (eˆ∗nt > 0) ,
(31)
where n = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T , X is a vector of explanatory variables,
and υ ∼ N(0, σ2υ) and α ∼ N(0, σ2α) are innovations and country-specific fixed
effects, respectively. Further details concerning the estimation procedures are
provided in the data appendix.
4.2 Dataset
The economic data were drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s Inter-
national Financial Statistics database. Data comprised 25 countries at monthly
frequency, beginning March 1995 and ending November 2002, for a total bal-
anced panel sample size of 2,317 observations (508 when output is included,
since these were only available on a quarterly basis). Our choice of countries
was conditioned primarily by the need for sufficient variability in time period
chosen; this unfortunately ruled out many countries with managed pegs that
did not display sufficient variations in their exchange rates. The full list of the
15These models have now become standard in the literature and hence we do not discuss
them in detail here. The interested reader may wish to consult Hamilton (1989) and Hsiao
(1996) for excellent discussions on each of these models.
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25 countries in the sample is given in the data appendix, which also describes
the variables used in detail.
The political data were obtained from the International Country Risk Guide,
published by the Political Risk Services Group. Political risk is comprised of
ten measures, which includes factors such as government stability, corruption,
and bureaucratic quality. The cumulative rating ranges [0, 100], with 100 being
the most favorable. To provide an intuitive feel of how countries place on the
scale, in November 2002, the United Kingdom received a score of 87.5, while
Turkey and Bolivia scored 58.5 and 67.5, respectively.
4.3 Results
On average, the Markov switching model identified 8 structural breaks for the
25 countries in the sample. However, for developed economies (excluding Is-
rael), the average was 6.5 structural breaks, while this figure was a higher 8.8
for developing countries. This is intuitive, as one would expect that develop-
ing economies are more susceptible to more swings in their currencies. The
estimated parameters for a selection of 3 countries (Japan, Korea, and Sierra
Leone) are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Regressions for structural breaks
(selected subsample)†
Japan Korea Sierra
Leone
λD 0.804 3.117 4.103
(0.48) (3.93) (2.83)
λD -1.356 0.173 0.788
(0.24) (1.50) (0.38)
σ2D 6.135 215.056 122.894
(1.90) (84.00) (52.26)
σ2R 31.413 4.310 7.786
(16.90) (0.78) (2.31)
ψDD 0.868 0.914 0.179
(0.11) (0.08) (0.19)
ψRR 0.572 0.988 0.787
(0.24) (0.01) (0.10)
Switches 4 2 22
Log likelihood -161.9 -150.9 -190.6
† Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Re-
sults of other countries available on request.
Figure 3(a), (b), and (c) graph the relationship between the change in the
exchange rate, the change in the political risk variable, and the regime switches
identified by the Markov switching regression for these respective countries. For
the case of Japan and Korea, it appears that the identified breaks correspond to
some broad pattern in the political risk variable; specifically, the breaks appear
to occur at or close to where there are significant changes in the political risk
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variable. For the case of Sierra Leone, it is difficult to note clean trends in
the data. However, if one disregards the clustered breaks, the regime breaks
between November 1995 and March 1997, March 1998 and May 1999, and April
2001 and December 2001 seem to be associated with significant changes in the
political risk variable as well.
To examine these features more rigorously, we turn to the panel Probit re-
gressions. The results here are, primarily, a test of Proposition 1. However, to
the extent that significant regime switches may also be indicative of a wider cur-
rency crisis, the results potentially speak to Proposition 2 as well. To allow for
this secondary case, we include explanatory variables from the latter proposition
as controls.16 Table 2 summarizes the results of the benchmark model.
The first two columns of Table 2 underscore the importance of utilizing esti-
mation techniques that take into account the underlying correlation structures
of a panel. These two specifications pool the data into a single continuous set,
and this leads to spurious efficiency, as evidenced by the low standard errors for
the political risk term.
In general, the results lend support to the idea that special interest pressures,
as measured by the degree of political risk, are a significant determinant of
exchange rate regime switches. All the coefficients for political risk are correctly
signed, and in most specifications are at least marginally statistically significant.
Moreover, they also economically significant: For example, taking the average
of the coefficients for political risk for specifications (B3 )–(B7 ), we find that a
1% increase in special interest pressures raises the probability of a regime switch
by 1.6%. The coefficients of the other control variables also tend to enter with
economically-logical signs, although they are mostly insignificant.
Adding the lagged level political risk leads to some interesting results. Doing
so clearly strengthens the impact of contemporaneous political risk on exchange
rate switching: Comparing the coefficients for political risk for specification
(B6 ) and (B7 ) with (B5 ), the point estimate increases by about threefold when
either one or two lags are included. There is in fact a very natural economic
explanation for this lagged term, which will be discussed below in the context
of the regressions with subsamples of the developed and developing country.
Dividing the panel into developed and developing countries yields further
insight into the nature of special interest political pressure. Table 3 repeats the
exercise for subsamples of developed and developing countries (excluding the
first two specifications).
For developed countries, the contemporaneous political risk variables are
all highly significant, and correctly signed. For developing countries, however,
contemporaneous political risk is insignificant, unless lagged political risk is in-
cluded (excluding the perverse result in specification (D3 ), which we discount
due to the far smaller sample size). For developing countries, therefore, con-
temporaneous special interest pressures need to be conditioned on the previous
period’s risk profile. This is intuitively plausible: For the presumably more ma-
16For example, we set X = [∆mnt,∆fnt,∆dnt,∆int,∆i∗nt,∆ynt, νnt]
′ for specification
(B4 ).
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Figure 3: Exchange rate, political risk, and regime switches.
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Table 3: Subsamples results for regime switches†
Developed
(D1 ) (D2 ) (D3 ) (D4 ) (D5 ) (D6 )
Political -3.510 -3.582 -4.140 -5.814 -5.338
risk (0.65)∗∗∗ (0.55)∗∗∗ (0.74)∗∗∗ (1.04)∗∗∗ (1.25)∗∗∗
1-period lagged 2.412 7.422
political risk (1.30)∗ (1.19)∗∗∗
2-period lagged -5.608
political risk (1.95)∗∗∗
∆ Political -3.159
risk (1.50)∗∗
∆ Money 1.299 1.319 1.371 1.244 1.435 1.031
supply (1.37) (1.44) (5.50) (1.40) (1.70) (1.52)
∆ Home 0.029 -0.329 -0.036 -0.032 -0.024
interest rate (0.08) (0.26) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09)
∆ Foreign -0.753 -0.211 -0.763 -0.782 -0.546
interest rate (0.37)∗∗ (0.47) (0.38)∗∗ (0.39)∗∗ (0.29)∗
∆ Reserves -0.712 -2.918 -0.638 -0.720 -0.255
(2.09) (1.91) (2.08) (2.40) (1.49)
∆ Domestic 0.512 -0.079 0.063 0.407 0.049
credit (1.11) (1.32) (1.62) (1.15) (0.93)
∆ Output -6.692
(11.15)
χ2 43.722 321.571 104.963 149.733 258.650 53.732
N 643 641 213 634 627 634
Developing
Political -0.345 -0.317 2.932 -2.839 -3.182
risk (0.43) (0.46) (1.39)∗∗ (1.30)∗∗ (1.14)∗∗∗
1-period lagged 2.614 0.515
political risk (1.53)∗ (1.52)
2-period lagged 2.434
political risk (0.92)∗∗∗
∆ Political -2.723
risk (1.40)∗
∆ Money -0.503 -0.286 -0.899 -0.310 -0.395 -0.299
supply (0.85) (0.86) (1.35) (0.84) (0.90) (0.83)
∆ Home 0.006 0.084 0.011 0.014 0.011
interest rate (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ Foreign 0.188 0.316 0.191 0.180 0.198
interest rate (0.21) (0.42) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
∆ Reserves -0.034 0.089 -0.053 -0.056 -0.051
(0.48) (0.69) (0.47) (0.46) (0.48)
∆ Domestic -0.729 0.239 -0.747 -0.760 -0.742
credit (0.86) (1.01) (0.95) (0.99) (0.95)
∆ Output -1.544
(0.48)∗∗∗
χ2 2.076 6.652 89.843 16.363 20.597 14.361
N 1488 1484 237 1468 1452 1468
† Notes: A constant term was included in the regressions, but not reported. Standard errors
are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5
percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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ture political markets in developed countries, policymakers respond more rapidly
and flexibly to new political information. In contrast, political interruptions and
events play a more central role in emerging economies, and governments may be
more unstable. Therefore, policymakers condition their regime change decisions
on past information regarding special interest pressures.
5 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a model of political competition over a devaluation
or revaluation of the exchange rate regime. Such deviations in the exchange rate
matter, because they affect the welfare of monopolistically-competitive agents
that possess ex ante productivity differentials, and facing short-run sticky prices.
The managed peg that results from the political-economic process, however, is
not neutral; in particular, we have demonstrated that lobbying contributions
from politically-organized groups lead to conditions that may affect the timing
as well as possibility of a currency crisis. Uncovering these special interest
influences reveals, ultimately, a golden fetter.
The data suggest that the implications of the model are not purely academic.
The question, then, is how to insulate the exchange rate regime process from
asymmetric political pressures. Our elaborations of the baseline model suggest
a way forward: The impact of lobbying contributions may be mitigated by
allowing greater independence to the central bank in effecting foreign exchange
interventions as required by the ministry of finance, or by allowing a more
democratic process in the formulation of proposals for such exchange rate regime
changes.
The shortcomings of our work suggests several avenues for future research.
By way of theory, the model does not satisfactorily include the actions of traders
in the foreign exchange market. This would be necessary if we were to extend
the analysis to a more liberal interpretation of a managed float. In addition,
we have limited our study of currency crises to first-generation models; a fuller
articulation of a political-economic currency crisis will need to address issues of
multiple equilibria common in latter-generation models. Finally, a more com-
plete empirical analysis would draw on a wider range of countries over a longer
time period, possibly at the annual frequency.
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Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds by, first, log-linearizing around the sym-
metric steady state;17 second, solving for short and long-run levels of key vari-
ables; and third, deriving the log-linearized expression for agent welfare. Much
of the proof draws on results from Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995), and we refer the
reader to that source for specific details of any particular equation.
The PPP relationship (17) holds in the steady state. This allows us to
establish the conditions that correspond to (11)–(13):
r¯ =
1− β
β
≡ γ, M¯
P¯
= χ
[
1 + γ
γ
]
C¯0 =
M¯∗
P¯ ∗
, y¯0 =
(
θ − 1
θκ
) 1
2
= y¯∗0 ,
where overbars indicate a steady state, and a null subscript on barred variables
denote the initial preshock symmetric steady state values, and we have used
Fisher parity for the middle expression. There are also steady-state market
clearing conditions derived from (4):
C¯ = γB¯ +
p¯ (h) y¯
P¯
, C¯∗ = −γB¯ + p¯
∗ (f) y¯∗
P¯ ∗
,
where symmetry allows us to rewrite Home and Foreign prices with that of a
representative household, holding the argument h and f , respectively. Assuming
zero initial foreign assets, B¯0 = 0—which is required for a simple closed-form
solution—the equilibrium is completely symmetric across both countries such
that p¯0(h)
P¯0
= p¯
∗
0(h)
P¯∗0
= 1, and so the above equations simplify to
C¯0 = C¯∗0 = y¯0 = y¯
∗
0 .
The linearized equations corresponding to (3), (8)–(9), (11)–(13), and (A.1) are
17We do so since there is no closed-form solution to the asymmetric steady state. This
assumption, while admittedly strong, allows us to keep the model focused on the political-
economic dynamics, without being bogged down with solving the economic model explicitly
for he heterogeneous agent case; see R´ıos-Rull (2001) for a discussion for techniques in this
regard. It is important to note, however, that we need interpret our results on welfare changes
as those that exist for agent i relative to that of a representative agent facing perturbations
from the symmetric steady state. A more involved solution of the economic model would
likely yield similar results, save for a more complicated agent welfare function.
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as follows:
pˆs =
1
2
pˆs (h) +
1
2
[εˆspˆ∗s (f)] , pˆ
∗
s =
1
2
[pˆs (h)− εˆs] + 12 pˆ
∗
s (f) ,
yˆs = θ
[
Pˆs − pˆs (h)
]
+ Cˆs, yˆ∗s = θ
[
Pˆ ∗s − pˆ∗s (f)
]
+ Cˆ∗s ,
Cˆs+1 = Cˆs +
γ
1 + γ
rˆs+1, Cˆ
∗
s+1 = Cˆ
∗
s +
γ
1 + γ
rˆ∗s+1,
Mˆs − Pˆs = Cˆs − rs+11 + γ −
Pˆs+1 − Pˆs
γ
, Mˆ∗s − Pˆ ∗s = Cˆ∗s −
rs+1
1 + γ
− Pˆ
∗
s+1 − Pˆ ∗s
γ
,
(θ + 1) yˆs = −θCˆs + CˆWs , (θ + 1) yˆ∗s = −θCˆ∗s + CˆWs ,
ˆ¯C = γ ˆ¯B + ˆ¯p (h) + ˆ¯y − ˆ¯P, ˆ¯C∗ = γ ˆ¯B + ˆ¯p∗ (f) + ˆ¯y∗ − ˆ¯P ∗,
where, for any variable X, xˆs ≡ dXsX¯0 , and XˆWs ≡
1
2Xˆs +
1
2Xˆ
∗
s . Finally, log-
linearization of (17) gives
εˆs = Pˆs − Pˆ ∗s .
Let the first period begin at time t. With one-period sticky prices, the labor-
leisure tradeoffs do not bind at s = t. A series of algebraic manipulations will
yield the following key variables:
Cˆt =
γ
2
(
θ2 − 1)
γ (1 + θ) + 2θ
εˆt + MˆWt ,
ˆ¯Ct =
γ
2
(
θ2 − 1)
γ (1 + θ) + 2θ
εˆt,
Yˆt = MˆWt +
1
2
θεˆt, ˆ¯yt =
γ
2 θ (θ − 1)
γ (1 + θ) + 2θ
εˆt,
where Y = y+y∗ is the aggregate output for a household. Now, we use the con-
venient shortcut introduced by Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) and focus on changes
in the real component of (1):
U ′is ≡
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
{
logCis −
κi
2
[ys (i)]
2
}
.
Total differentiation of this expression yields
dU ′is = Cˆt −
2κi (θ − 1)
κθ
(yˆt) +
1
γ
[
ˆ¯C − κ
i (θ − 1)
κθ
(
ˆ¯y
)]
,
where we have substituted for the initial steady-state value of y¯0. Making the
necessary substitutions from above, obtain
dU ′is =
(1 + γ)
(
θ2 − 1)
2 [γ (1 + θ) + 2θ]
(
1− κ
i
κ
)
εˆt +
1
θ
MˆW . (A.1)
Hence, changes in the exchange rate affect the real component of utility. Allow-
ing for χ→ 0, which implies that derived utility from real goods dominate total
utility changes vis-a´-vis derived utility from real balances, allows us to rewrite
the above expression as dU ′is ≈ dU is.
28
Proof of Corollary 1. Since, by Lemma 1, the exchange rate affects each agent
asymmetrically, it follows for any given deviation of the exchange rate there
must exist agents that benefit more or less from this change. Moreover, their
resultant change in welfare may be greater or less than zero, since (A.1) implies
that sgn
(
dU is
)
depends on sgn
(
1− κi/κ) ≷ 0 (as well as sgn (θ2 − 1), although
this effect is symmetric for all agents).
Proof of Corollary 2. Taking the derivative of (24) with respect to ν gives the
following expression:
∂D
∂ν
=
2ΦI
(
Φι + ην2ΦJ
)
∆
[
−2ηνΦI
∫
I
MˆW
θ
− 2ηνΦJ Mˆ
W
θ
]
+
4ηνΦJΦI
∆
·[(
−Φι + ην2ΦJ + 4Φ
I
N
)
MˆW
2θ
+ ΦI
(
1
4η
+ ην2
∫
J
MˆW
θ
)]
,
where ∆ =
[
2ΦI
(
ην2ΦJ + Φι
)]2
> 0. Substituting Φι = 0 into the above and
simplifying leaves
num
[
∂D
∂ν
]
= ηΦJ
(
ΦI
)2
+
2ηνMˆW
θ
[
4ΦJ
(
ΦI
)2
N
− 2ην2 (ΦJ)2 ΦI] .
With ΦJ > 0,ΦI < 0, all the terms above are unambiguously positive.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let F0, D0 denote initial levels of reserves and debt, re-
spectively, and so fs ≈ sµ + f0 and ds ≈ sµ + d0 (after imposing ξs = 0).
Furthermore, a fixed rate implies εs = ε¯ ∀s. Substituting these results into (25)
and (27) and simplifying yields
ε¯ = sµ+ (f0 + d0)− γZ1 + γ , (A.2)
which holds for all s⇔ µ = 0. This proves the first part of the lemma.
To prove the second part, we follow Flood & Garber (1984) and define a
shadow exchange rate as the exchange rate that would prevail conditional on
exhaustion of reserves. By applying the method of undetermined coefficients
this can be shown to be
ε˜s =
γ
1 + γ
(µ− Φ) + sµ+ d0,
since fs = 0 by definition. Denote T as the time of attack. By the no-arbitrage
condition, we require ε˜s = ε¯, which after simplification gives
T =
ε¯+ γZ1+γ − d0
µ
− γ
1 + γ
6= T˜ .
Substitution of (A.2) supplies the required value of T , which completes the
proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Substitute the exchange rate from Proposition 1 into
the optimal abandonment time in Lemma 2 to obtain
T˘ =
ε˘+ γZ1+γ − d0
µ
− γ
1 + γ
6= T˜ ,
which proves the second part of the proposition. The first part of the proposition
is proven by using ε˘ = ε¯± εD from Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. The loss function to be minimized is given by
Ls = ρ˜
(
pis − εDs
)2
+ (pis − pies − ζs − k)2 + ωpi2s ,
where pies ≡ Es−1pis, and we have used the PPP relation, the definition of
inflation, and assumption of constant foreign prices to substitute for the first
term on the RHS, and the standard approach of allowing an output wedge
y˜s − y¯ = ks > 0, (29), and the assumption about wage setting behavior for the
second term. The first order necessary condition is
pis =
ks + εDs ρ˜
ω + ρ˜
+
ζs
1 + ω + ρ˜
.
By the implicit function theorem, obtain
∂ω
∂ρ˜
= − (1 + 2ω + 2ρ˜)
(
ωεDs − ks
)
+ (ω + ρ˜)2
(
ωεDs − ks − ζs
)
(1 + 2ω + 2ρ˜) (ρ˜εDs − ks) + (ω + ρ˜)2 (ωεDs − ks − ζs)
(A.3)
With no preferences concerning output, ks = ζs = 0, then (A.3) above is unam-
biguously negative. With such preferences, ρ˜ > 1 and εDs > ks + ζs is sufficient
to render (A.3) negative (recall ω > 1).
Proof of Proposition 4. As the final two stages of the game remain unchanged,
both the monetary authority and lobbying groups have no incentive to change
their strategies, and the results are the same as before. In the first stage, the
randomly-selected agenda setter a will maximize the expected welfare of her
constituent:
U l = ψDU i
(
εDl
)
+ ψRU i
(
εRl
)
.
The first order condition simplifies to
εDl =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣−
(
Φι + ην2ΦJ + Φi
) 4
N Mˆ
W
2θ + Φ
i
(
1
4η + ην
2
∫
i∈J
MˆW
θ di
)
2Φi (Φι + ην2ΦJ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = εRl, (A.4)
which establishes the first part of the proposition. Now, any given legislator l′ 6=
l will vote for the proposal in (A.4) if and only if EU l
(
εkl
) ≥ EU l (εk) ∀k =
D,R, or if εkl− εk ≥ 0 ∀k = D,R. Imposing Φι = 0 from the proposition and
simplifying yields
εkl − εk = −Mˆ
W
(
4
NΦ
I − Φi)
θΦiΦI
,
which summing over all legislators in Home must exceed N4 for majority, thus
establishing the second part of the proposition.
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A.2 Extensions
This addendum outlines a model with a more explicit production side of the
economy. We retain most of the notation in the main text, and only define new
variables. Preferences are now given by
U it =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
logCis + χ log
M is
Ps
− κ
2
ls (i)
2
]
, (A.5)
where l is labor input. Each individual Home agent is therefore a monopolistic
supplier of labor on the interval i ∈ [0, 12], with Foreign agents on i ∈ ( 12 , 1].
The consumption and price indices are, respectively:
Cis =
[∫ 1
0
cis (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
, (A.6)
Ps =
[∫ 1
0
ps (z)
1−θ
dz
] 1
1−θ
, (A.7)
where goods are produced by monopoly firms indexed on a unit interval z ∈[
0, 12
]
at Home and z ∈ ( 12 , 1] in Foreign. As usual, analogous aggregators C∗
and P ∗ hold for Foreign.
The nominal period budget constraint now includes labor w (i) and equity
Π (i) income, instead of revenue:
PsB
i
s+1+M
i
s = Ps (1 + rs)B
i
s+M
i
t−1+ws (i) ls (i)+Πs (i)−PsCis−Psτs. (A.8)
Wages are set one period in advance of production and consumption, at time
(t− 1). The production of a representative home good i utilizes all (differenti-
ated) domestic labor inputs, and is
ys (z) =
1
2
[
2
∫ 1
2
0
lzs (i)
φ−1
φ di
] φ
φ−1
, (A.9)
where φ > 1 is the substitution elasticity between different labor inputs. Given
a distribution of wages, the price index for labor inputs is
Ws =
[∫ 1
2
0
ws (i)
1−φ
di
] 1
1−φ
. (A.10)
The demand for Home and Foreign goods are the same as in the text ((8) and
(9) respectively), and world demand for good z is
ys (z) =
[
ps (z)
Ps
]−θ ∫ 1
2
0
Cis di+
[
p∗s (z)
P ∗s
]−θ ∫ 1
1
2
C∗is di (A.11)
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In a similar fashion, we can obtain from the wage index (A.10) an implied
demand by firm z for labor offered by i:
lzs (i) =
[
ws (i)
Ws
]−φ
ys (z) , (A.12)
which, on aggregate, gives
ls (i) =
∫ 1
2
0
[
ws (i)
Ws
]−φ
ys (z) dz. (A.13)
Pricing of both factors and products reflect the monopolistically competitive
structure of the economy. Returns to labor i is then given by
ws (i)
Ps
· 1
Cis
=
φ
φ− 1κls (i) , (A.14)
which means that real factor prices wP are sold at a constant markup
φ
φ−1 over
the marginal disutility of labor κls (i). A product z is likewise priced as a
markup over unit marginal costs:
ps (z) =
θ
θ − 1
ws (i) ls (i)
ys (z)
, εsp
∗
s (z) =
θ
θ − 1
ws (i) ls (i)
y∗s (z)
. (A.15)
Now, by assuming differentiated ownership of assets and sticky prices and wages
abroad, we will be able to show a dependence of agent welfare on the exchange
rate, similar to Lemma 1. To derive the aggregate supply function described in
Section 3, log-linearize (A.15) around the symmetric steady state to obtain
yˆs = wˆs − pˆs + lˆs. (A.16)
Assuming equal use of all inputs—which would be the case in the flexible price
symmetric equilibrium—and a supply shock given by ζ allows us to rewrite (A.9)
such that
y¯ = lˆs + ζ.
Substituting the above into (A.16), and aggregating over all agents, and impos-
ing the (intuitive) coefficient of −1 for real wages then gives us the expression
in the text.
A.3 Data
The financial data were sourced from the IMF’s International Financial Statis-
tics (IFS) database. The variables specifically implied by the model that we
used are the money supply (34...ZF),18 international reserves (.1..SZF), domes-
tic credit (32...ZF), gross domestic product (99B..ZF), and interest rates. Home
18Notice that, in contrast to the theoretical model, we use changes in domestic, as opposed
to the world money supply. This, we feel, is a better translation of the implications of the
theoretical model to the estimating variables.
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rates were taken to be the lending rates (60P..ZF) for the country in question,
unless no such data were available, in which case deposit rates (60L..ZF) were
used as a substitute. Foreign rates used the discount rate (60...ZF) of the United
States.
As discussed in the text, political risk data were from the PRS Group’s Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Political risk is comprised of ten measures.
These include factors such as government stability, corruption, democratic ac-
countability, and bureaucracy quality, with possible further subcomponent mea-
sures. For example, government stability is further subdivided into government
unity, legislative strength, and popular support. Each of these components are
scored and aggregated into a cumulative political risk rating.
Estimation of (30) was effected through maximum likelihood using the ex-
pectation maximization (EM) algorithm (Hamilton 1989) with priors set to 0.2,
1, and 0.1 for α, β, and γ, respectively. Estimation of (31) was with an itera-
tive Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) approach for panel data (Liang &
Zeger 1986).
Table A.1: Countries included in sample
Albania Australia Bolivia Canada Denmark
Gambia, The Guatemala India Israel Jamaica
Japan Korea Lebanon New Zealand Pakistan
Paraguay Peru Philippines Sierra Leone Singapore
South Africa Tunisia Turkey Uganda United Kingdom
A.4 Notation
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β Subjective discount rate B Stock of riskless bonds
χ Weight of real balances c(z) (C) Consumption of good z (index)
ε (ε˘) Exchange rate (with peg) D Domestic credit
Φ Exchange rate impact E Expectations operator
γ Rate of time preference F Foreign reserves
η Deval preference parameter G Government expenditure
ι Marginal agent i Nominal interest rate
κ Inverse productivity measure I Set of agent population
µ Growth rate of money supply J Set of lobbying groups
ν Influence of lobbying activity L Lobbying contributions
pi Inflation (MW ) M (World) stock of money
θ Elasticity of substitution p(z) (P ) Price of good z (index)
(ρ˜) ρ (Ex ante) deval preference r Real interest rate
τ Lump sum tax T (T˘ ) Time of crisis (with peg)
ξ Nominal primary deficit U Lifetime utility
ω Weight on inflation V Net group welfare
ψ Probability of regime change y(i) (y˜) Production by agent i (target)
ζ Supply shock Z Foreign parameters
α˜, β˜, δ˜ Bayesian priors pi Transition probabilities
Γ Regression coefficients α Country fixed effects
Θ Population parameters X Macroeconomic controls
υ Disturbance term eˆ (Binary) regime switch
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